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Abstract: When deciding upon the price to charge for one of their
products, the managers of the Soho Foundry in Birmingham placed
great reliance upon the data stored in their accounting system. By
the last decade of the 18th century, the nature of the steam engine
business was changing rapidly and reputation alone was insufficient
to attract customers. Also, as more industrialists decided upon
steam as a source of power and competition to supply their needs
increased, more attention had to be paid to price structures. The
increasing standardization of products meant that a price list could
be determined. The partners showed some reluctance to come to
terms with the pricing issue, insisting that the quality of their prod-
uct was of more importance than its price. This paper addresses the
processes undertaken at the Soho Foundry to establish price lists for
engines and parts. It shows that prices were based on the cost of
previous machines, this cost being calculated using predetermined
rates as shown in the engine books. The paper concludes with the
observation that continual reliance on historical data was one of the
factors contributing to the firm’s loss of its competitive edge.
INTRODUCTION
The 18th century in Britain was a time of transition in
managerial practices. In the course of half a century, manufac-
turing in a number of industries moved from cottages and small
workshops to great factories employing hundreds of people
[Pollard, 1965]. Change came about as each manufacturing or-
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ganization responded to the challenges and the opportunities
offered by new technologies and markets. The entrepreneurs of
the time faced administrative as well as technical problems as
their businesses evolved. Accounting often assumed new dimen-
sions as it assisted entrepreneurs in coping with and adjusting
to change.
In spite of, or perhaps because of, Pollard’s [1965, p. 248]
claim that cost accounting played an insignificant role in mana-
gerial decision making during the Industrial Revolution, there
has developed a growing body of literature about the manage-
ment accounting practices employed by the newly emerging
businesses as each developed an accounting that suited its par-
ticular needs. Chatfield [1977, p. 101] tended to support
Pollard’s limited view of cost accounting when he asserted that
a major use for cost data was to assist and moderate price
estimates given by engineering firms. Certainly this was an im-
portant use of cost information, but it was by no means the
only one. It is certainly a view not held by Robert Hamilton, the
author of An Introduction to Merchandize, published in 1777
[see Mepham, 1988a,b for a discussion of this text]. According
to Mepham, in addition to discussing practical costing tech-
niques, Hamilton emphasized the use of cost to assist manage-
rial efficiency [Mepham, 1988b, p. 55].
Since Pollard, there have been a number of studies which
have lent support for a wider view of the involvement of ac-
counting as a managerial tool during the Industrial Revolution
in Britain. For example, McKendrick [1970] discussed Josiah
Wedgwood’s use of cost information by highlighting an incident
where the calculation of costs by Wedgwood served as a check
on the profits reported by the firm’s bookkeeper. Wedgwood
also used cost data to moderate prices during periods when
trade was slack.
Edwards [1989] reviewed cost accounting developments in
Britain to 1830 and concluded that a wide range of managerial
decisions were supported by accounting data, a conclusion also
reached by Fleischman and Parker [1990, 1991, 1992, 1997] in
their investigations of the use of cost data for managerial pur-
poses over a number of firms. Their 1991 article reported a
survey of costing practices in 25 firms active during this period
in which they found significant use of cost techniques as an aid
to management. On the level of an individual firm, Fleischman
et al. [1995] examined in some detail the cost investigations of
James Watt jnr in the negotiation of a piece rate for the
moulders at Boulton and Watt’s (B&W hereafter) Soho Foundry
2
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in 1802. This incident was also referred to by Williams [1994]
in a discussion of the character of James Watt jnr.
Further evidence of the wider use of management account-
ing can be found in Walsh and Stewart’s [1992] examination of
the management accounting used by Robert Owen at his New
Lanark (Scotland) cotton mill during the first part of the 19th
century. They concluded that Owen had given accounting a role
in the transformation of his workers from contractors to em-
ployees.
Other examples of this expanding literature are to be found
in Edwards and Baber [1979] with their discussion of cost ac-
counting at the Dowlais Iron Company, Stone’s [1973] descrip-
tion of the Chorlton Mills of Manchester, Beckett’s [1977] case
study of a factory in the 1740s, and Jones’ [1985] extensive
discussion of the use of cost accounting in Wales in the 18th
century. A number of other articles explored different facets of
the active use of management accounting during this period,
adding to the weight of evidence refuting Pollard’s view [see, for
example, Edwards and Newell, 1991; Edwards and Boyns, 1992;
Fleischman and Tyson, 1993; Williams, 1997; Fleischman and
Tyson, 1998].
This paper is concerned with the accounting activities of
the B&W organization at Birmingham, a firm which is well
known for its efficient operation [see, for example, Roll, 1930;
Pollard, 1965; Fleischman and Parker, 1991; Fleischman, 1993;
Williams, 1994, 1997; Fleischman et al., 1995]. This paper aims
to add to the literature by exploring in depth one aspect of
B&W’s use of cost data, specifically its use of past costs in the
development of a pricing policy for steam engines in the late
18th and early 19th centuries. It will also demonstrate the
firm’s reliance on this information in order to remain competi-
tive in the face of an expanding market. The paper also adds to
the work of Roll [1930] by providing detail of the material used
by B&W in the development of its price list.
This paper adopts a microhistorical approach to the study
of the development of B&W’s prices because it is concerned
with the actions and the thoughts of the individual actors. The
term “microhistory” encompasses the study of an incident or
individual in-depth rather than a group of people or an aggrega-
tion of events [for a further discussion of the term see
Ginzburg, 1980, 1993]. It is not suggested that the process of
price development used by B&W was typical of manufacturers
in general. The study of the practice of accounting in a particu-
lar situation, however, does lead to a greater understanding of
3
Williams: Management accounting practice and price calculation at Boulton and Watt's Soho Foundry: A late 18th century example
Published by eGrove, 1999
Accounting Historians Journal, December 199968
accounting in its wider context. There is a danger when concen-
trating at a microlevel of obscuring the wider issues. A
microhistory approach to the study of business practices in
18th century Britain, when there appeared to have been no
standard management accounting practices, can do much to
broaden our understanding, as each firm devised its own ac-
counting information system in accordance with the precepts
and views of its proprietor(s). Sharpe [1990, p. 35] points out
how:
. . . once a grasp of the society in question has been
established, the isolated social event or individual . . .
can be used to provide a pathway to a deeper under-
standing of that society.
Microhistory allows us to explore the reaction of individu-
als to the discipline imposed by the practice of accounting. The
comprehensiveness of the cost data accumulated at the Soho
Foundry has been mentioned by Roll [1930], Pollard [1965],
and others as being well in advance of other firms. However,
this assertion is based on existing, limited archival evidence. It
may be that other firms may have used similar systems. Never-
theless, an understanding of the solutions B&W developed in
response to its competitive environment provides an interesting
study on its own. The series of documents described in the
latter part of this paper illustrates a progression in corporate
reasoning as the partners attempted to position their firm in an
increasingly competitive market.1
The manufacture of steam engines in the closing decades of
the 18th century was a highly competitive business. B&W had
to contend with other manufacturers who either pirated their
design [Tann, 1980] or who made the older Newcomen engine
which, although not as efficient as Watt’s design, was feasible
where coal was readily available [Hills, 1993]. Expanding cot-
ton manufacture and its demand for power stimulated the mar-
ket for steam engines. The impending expiration of Watt’s
patent in 1800 also stimulated interest in the market by poten-
tial manufacturers who were aware of the demand for these
machines [see, for example, Briggs, 1982; Hills, 1993]. Even
though the B&W organization tended to compete on quality
1The Birmingham Central Library holds the exceptionally well preserved
and very extensive Boulton and Watt archive. In all of the examples, original
spelling and formating have been maintained as far as possible.
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and reputation2 rather than price, it was concerned with the
competition and did pay attention to costs when working up a
price for a potential customer. It is the aim of this paper to
examine the calculations undertaken in the process of price
determination at B&W’s Soho Foundry, a purpose-built, steam
engine factory.
The first part of the paper provides a brief discussion of the
B&W firm and the events that led to the establishment of the
Soho Foundry. The second part of the paper describes the de-
liberations of the partners as they were confronted with the
need to establish a standard price list. The discussion illustrates
their use of cost information in this process.
THE STEAM ENGINE BUSINESS
The original partnership of B&W, formed in 1775, was es-
tablished to act as consulting engineers in the erection of steam
engines designed by James Watt [Roll, 1930; Dickinson, 1935;
Tann, 1981; Law, 1990]. The steam engine developed by James
Watt3 was more efficient and economical than the other engines
then available [Roll, 1930; Dickinson, 1935; Law, 1990]. Ini-
tially the partnership supplied drawings of an engine and super-
vised its construction. Most of the parts of these custom-built
engines were made by subcontractors who bore a large part of
the risk. Matthew Boulton4 and James Watt selected appropri-
ate specialists for particular pieces, more on the basis of the
quality of their work than cost, because of a concern for the
firm’s reputation [Tann, 1981]. However, as time went by, in
order to maintain the high quality of the product, more and
more parts were made in Boulton’s Soho Manufactory. By the
early 1790s, over 50% of the value of the engines was made by
the partners [Tann, 1981]. The nature of the business was
2In a letter to John Southern dated April 24, 1799, James Watt jnr wrote
“ . . . it is not our wish to vie with others in lowness of estimates, but in good-
ness of workmanship, being well convinced by long experience that the best
Engines are the cheapest in the end” [B&W 33/5].
3James Watt (1736-1819) was born in Greenock, Scotland. He developed
improvements to the steam engines then in use by using steam to exert a
positive force on the piston and condensing the steam outside the cylinder.
These improvements were patented in 1769, with the patent being extended in
1775. Watt formed the partnership with Boulton to exploit these ideas.
4 Matthew Boulton (1728-1809) was an established manufacturer of buck-
les and other metal ornaments in Birmingham, England. His manufactory was
established at Soho, just outside Birmingham.
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changing as well, with customers being more interested in pur-
chasing a complete engine rather than being bothered with the
close involvement in its construction that had been necessary to
this point [Dickinson, 1936]. Other incentives that inclined the
partners towards manufacture in their own right included the
attraction of a greater share of the profits, which hitherto had
been taken by the external subcontractors. Even though these
subcontractors were selected because of their ability, they were
not solely concerned with the manufacture of steam engine
parts which led to problems with quality control as well as a
lack of standardization5 between subcontractors. This, together
with the difficulties involved in coordinating the subcontrac-
tors, encouraged the partners’ new direction [Tann, 1981].
By late 1794, B&W had come to the view that it would have
to manufacture complete steam engines and not depend on
subcontractors. In October a new partnership under the name
of Boulton, Watt & Sons was formed to manufacture steam
engines at a new foundry in Birmingham [Roll, 1930;
Dickinson, 1935; Tann, 1981]. The partners were Matthew
Boulton, and his son Matthew6, James Watt, and his sons James
jnr 7 and Gregory8.
SOHO FOUNDRY
The Soho Foundry was intended from the outset to be run
as a separate business by Matthew Robinson Boulton, James
Watt jnr, and Gregory Watt. Construction began in 1795 and
was completed in the next year [Roll, 1930; Dickinson, 1935;
Gale, 1962; Tann, 1981]. The Foundry was designed to manu-
facture complete engines and was unique in that, unlike other
factories at the time which produced a varied number of prod-
ucts, its sole purpose was the manufacture of steam engines
[Roll, 1930; Gale, 1962]. The new factory did not replace
5Most of the engine cylinders were made at the Wilkinsons’ Bersham Iron-
works, but an argument between the partners John and William Wilkinson and
the resultant closure of the works ended this source of supply. Cylinders cast
and bored by the Coalbrookdale Company were reasonably satisfactory, but
this firm was unable to meet the demand. Cylinders produced elsewhere were
unsatisfactory [Rolt, 1962].
6(1770-1842)
7(1769- 1848)
8Gregory Watt (1777-1804) was a half-brother to James jnr. Always suffer-
ing poor health, he died of consumption at the age of 27 [Rolt, 1962].
6
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Boulton’s Soho Manufactory which continued to assemble en-
gines and make parts for a number of years.
In its first year of operation, the Soho Foundry accepted
orders for 31 engines and by 1800 had produced 169 [Tann,
1981]. Matthew Robinson Boulton seems to have been very
much involved in the initial planning for the Foundry, while
James Watt jnr, judging from the amount of calculations and
costings in his handwriting, seems to have been more con-
cerned with managing daily operations [Dickinson, 1936].
The Soho Foundry had three main operating departments.
The Foundry Department cast engine parts, the Smithy Depart-
ment manufactured parts from wrought iron, and the Fitting
Department machined the parts and fitted the engine together.
Each of these departments was treated as a profit center. The
products of both the Foundry and the Manufactory were sold
by one organization, but the records distinguish between the
products of each. The Soho Foundry was operated as an inde-
pendent entity and was expected to make a profit, as were each
of its operating departments.
PRICES
Originally, the older Watt and Boulton charged a yearly
premium for their engines rather than a straightforward price
because they supplied the knowledge to build the engine rather
than the individual parts [Tann, 1981; Hills, 1993]. When first
introduced, the premium was equal to one-third of the savings
in coal usage which resulted from the more efficient B&W en-
gine compared to the older atmospheric steam engine [Tann,
1981]. This was an ingenious and profitable procedure as the
partners tended to sell the majority of their engines to the
mines in Cornwall where coal was very expensive and the sav-
ings due to the Watt engine considerable. As the organization
supplied more and more engine parts, it charged for those parts
supplied. The yearly premium or royalty was based on the ac-
tual number of strokes made by the engine as measured by a
counter designed by Watt9 [Rolt, 1962; Tann, 1981]. Eventually
9Watt snr carried out a number of experiments to determine the relative
efficiency of various sizes of engines and developed a calculation to enable him
to determine the premium payable on any one engine. To decide the actual
premium in any one year, it was necessary to determine the amount of work
done, so he invented a device to count the strokes of the engine [Dickenson,
1935; Rolt, 1962]. Eventually, the premium was calculated by using a formula
based on horsepower [Fleischman and Parker, 1992].
7
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the royalty became fixed at £5 per horsepower per year for
rotative10 engines used outside London and £6 for engines used
in London [Jones, 1973; Tann, 1981; Fleischman and Parker,
1992].
By the 1790s, engine purchasers were given the opportunity
to commute the premium by discounting it to a lump sum.
According to Tann [1981], the majority of new purchasers ac-
cepted this offer. A letter to Watt jnr from John Southern [B&W
19/6] shows an example of the calculation for the commutation
of a premium. By the time the organization was supplying the
whole engine and steam engines had become a commodity, it
was obvious that the pricing system was inadequate. Roll [1930,
p. 312] quoted a table titled “Prices for Rotative Engines” which
he believed relates to August 1795. This table shows a compari-
son of the amount the firm could expect from a number of
different-sized engines based on parts supplied plus the pre-
mium over five years compared to a fixed price based on the
cost of the engine plus a markup of 50%. The amounts calcu-
lated by the two methods were very similar, so a change to a set
price would not reduce profitability and would reduce the work
required to collect the premium.
Need for Change: Determining the price to charge seems to have
been a continual problem to Watt jnr and Matthew Robinson
Boulton. Increasing competition, from manufacturers such as
Matthew Murray and Richard Trevithick [Hills, 1993], coupled
with the fact that the annual premium was never popular with
the customers, meant the partners had to pay strict attention to
pricing. It was no longer sufficient to trade on quality alone.
The change from charging a premium based on usage to a set
price required a change in methods of calculation. To this end,
engine cost became the basis for price calculation.
There was a common pricing structure for the engines built
by B&W, whether they were built at Soho Foundry or as-
sembled at the Soho Manufactory. The prices charged did not
include transport, which was paid by the purchaser. After test-
ing, the engines were disassembled for transportation and usu-
ally shipped by canal barge.
10Originally steam engines had a reciprocating motion, but by using a sun
and planet gear this was transferred into a rotational force. Referred to as
“rotative” engines, this was an important innovation since it meant that steam
engines could be coupled directly to other machinery.
8
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The considerable correspondence and price calculations
still existing are an indication of the partners’ concern for
prices. The first word came from the elder James Watt in a
letter to Matthew Robinson Boulton:
Soho June 1st 1796
Mr M. R. Boulton
Dear Sir
As your father & myself considering the general sub-
ject of premiums it appeared to us that they might with
propriety be charged as follows taking Mr Southern’s11
estimate of 12 horse engine for an example
neat cost materials £308
manufacturing profit 20 pr% 68
Premium 50 pr Ct on neat cost 154
Boiler 60
10 pr% on Do 6
———
£596
———
or if you think that is too little
materials & 20 pr% 376
premium 50 pr% 188
Boiler + 10 pr cent 66
———
£630
We think that we have no title to 50 pr % on boilers
not being made by ourselves, there is little besides the
risk of bad debts - however we wish to leave the whole
open till we are all at home, & I think it cannot be
satisfactorily settled till there is a view of this years
transactions & profit, at present it is better to ask
something too much than too little.
Small engines should pay a greater percentage than
larger ones, otherwise will be attended with loss, as
requiring so much trouble, we should look now to the
conclusion of the patent & when all settle prices settle
also what we can probably work for when that is re-
quired.
11John Southern (1758-1815) joined B&W as an assistant draughtsman in
1782 and remained with the firm until his death in 1815. He was a trusted and
valued friend and employee and he was admitted as a partner in 1810. South-
ern is reputed to have invented a device for measuring changing cylinder pres-
sures in 1796 [Roll, 1930; Dickinson, 1935; Rolt, 1962].
9
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I have no news since my last & remain
Dear Sir
Yours affectly
James Watt
[B&W D/1]
While having an appreciation of the direct cost of manufac-
ture, the letter indicates that Watt was unsure about indirect
costs with the markups of 50% on cost as well as an allowance
for manufacturing profit. The “neat cost materials” referred to
the cost of the various engine parts which included material
plus direct labor [as detailed in the Engine Books B&W 231].
The alternative calculations provide an interesting comparison
by allowing a markup on the profit already added to the cost.
Each of the operating departments at the Soho Foundry
was expected to make a profit. The transfer price from each
department included a markup to which the organization
added another allowance for profit to the accumulated cost.
Pollard [1963] suggested that this practice had its origins in the
traditional practice of subcontracting with each department
treated as if it were an independent unit. This relationship was
illustrated in the discussions leading to the fixing of piece rates
for the moulders described in Fleischman et al. [1995] and Will-
iams [1994]. Whatever its origin, this practice was an efficient
way of managing the operation with responsibility for profit-
able operation being given to the managers. Documents from
MPB 285/28 [quoted in Williams, 1997, p. 177] show a com-
parative profit and loss account for the Smithy, Foundry and
Fitting Departments for the Soho Foundry for 1798. The
Smithy made a loss while the other two departments made
gains.
The steam engine business was very profitable for the firm,
and prices it charged were considered by some higher than
perhaps they should have been. The young partners were obvi-
ously sensitive to this public opinion as the following extract in
a letter from Watt jnr to M. R. Boulton (July 10, 1798) shows
[B&W E7]:
. . . opposition we experienced from Murray12 at Leeds,
that attempted by Hawkes here & the report generally
12Matthew Murray manufactured engines in Leeds. Boulton and Watt had
suspicions that Murray had infringed the patent but took no action against
him until after 1800 when they opposed his patent application [Tann, 1980].
10
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prevalent & generally accredited of the enormity of our
profits upon Rotative Engines [emphasis added], make
me think seriously that we ought at an early period,
perhaps at the close of our books in Sepr to adopt a
new Tarif of Prices. If the present premium on
Rotatives were reduced to 30 per %, we might keep it
at that rate for a few months & then reduce it farther if
judged eligible. It should also be an object of consider-
ation, whether the Londoners should not be put upon
the same footing with their neighbours in the Country.
Perhaps 25 per % might be advisable for Colliery En-
gines, in order still to keep up some distinction be-
tween them & others as arising from the very great
difference of the value of savings. It will be prudent in
us whilst we yet may, to secure the trade in our own
hands, by removing in part the incitement to rivalship
& bringing matters to that state, in which we can still
carry on the business with a reasonable profit after the
expiration of the patent.
The move to lower the prices was caused by a desire to
reduce potential competition. This is reinforced by Watt’s com-
ment about colliery engines. Collieries had the advantage of
cheap coal which made the less efficient but cheaper atmo-
spheric engines more cost effective and a viable alternative to
the B&W product. The letter implies a reluctance by Watt jnr to
let go of the “enormity of our profits on Rotative Engines,” with
an almost fatalistic acceptance that the good times were draw-
ing to a close, requiring the firm to bow to the inevitable lower-
ing of prices and profits.
Development of a Price List: By 1798, 14 engine sizes were of-
fered to the market [Roll, 1930]. Each was customized to the
requirements of the customer but was assembled from standard
components, allowing a standard price to be set. Whether to
charge a different price to customers in London was a question
the firm struggled to answer and one that was unresolved for
some time.
James Watt jnr proposed a differential price structure in a
letter to Boulton jnr several months later [MBP 353/61]:
Horses Country London Addl
Boiler
4 £350 £366  £32
6  379  398 38
8  473  497 45
10  523  548 60
11
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12  560  588 68
16  727  763 90
20  800  840  110
24 1040 1092  132
30 1120 1176  160
32 1156 1214  172
M R Boulton
Scarborough
Soho 11 Sepr 1798
Above you have a synopsis of the new Estimates.
They may reckoned to take place in all Engines sent
from hence after the end of the present Month.
In framing these, the old estimates have been left
quite out of the question & we have proceeded upon
what appeared to be the real costs by Foreman’s books
[emphasis added13]. These we have determined by tak-
ing out all those of a size that have been made since
the prices were raised & the steam cases added; we
have then deduced an average cost and added about 5
per % to cover deficiencies & to provide for trifling
additions either in the way of improvements or ex-
traordinary size of Rotative Shaft & c. The Boilers have
been taken as they stand charged in Foreman’s books
(where a profit of 16 per % is already laid on by the
Manufactory, which considering the little trouble we
have with them is enough on that score) and their aver-
age amount has been added to the sum obtained as
above for metal materials. This has been assumed as
the full cost & to it has been added 33 per % for the
country prices & 40 per % for London.
An example will make this more clear.
The Average Cost of the MM of a 4 Horse Eng. £220
5 per % about £ 10
Foreman’s charge for Boiler 32
——
Total manufacturing cost £262
Country premium 33 per % 88
——
New Country Price £350
====
If the boiler is not to be furnished by us you deduct
its cost as stated in the fourth column & we remain in
13Foreman was the accountant/bookkeeper for the Engine Manufactory; he
did have an oversight over the accounting records for the manufacture of
engines whether made at the Foundry or Manufactory.
12
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proportion of the percentage charged for Premium.
This appeared the simplest mode of proceeding - The
London prices have been calculated at 40 per cent. It
was thought advisable not to bring them down at once
to the country prices, but to lessen the disparity gradu-
ally; the one is therefore reduced 17 & the other 23 per
% -
Perhaps upon comparing these with the old prices,
you may not think we have taken off enough; neither
do I. But it may be well to go to work gradually, to try
these for half a year & then perhaps to come down to
25 per % on the Country & 33 on the [London]
I have also to add, that Southern otherwise engaged,
these estimates have been taken somewhat grossly and
will admit of revisions and corrections when we are all
together. For the present, they are on the safe side.
[Signed] J Watt junr.
These prices were based on costs in the Manufactory, but
applied to those engines produced by the Foundry as well. The
term MM refers to metal materials; i.e., the cost of the various
parts and the assembly of the engine. Watt’s calculations show
some inaccuracies, which is rather surprising for one who was
usually very meticulous.
The partners showed further concern with public opinion
as well as the effects of increasing competition. Boulton & Watt
engines enjoyed a considerable reputation for quality, but they
were expensive. There were other manufacturers in the market,
who, the partners felt, did not offer products comparable in
quality, but whose engines nevertheless met most of the cus-
tomers’ needs at a lower price.14 The cotton manufacturers, a
major group of potential buyers, were interested in value for
money and were prepared to seek alternative solutions to their
power problems. Consequently, the firm had to contend with
water power as well as other engine makers.
Matthew Robinson Boulton reiterated the concern with
public opinion when he wrote to James Watt jnr, who was in
London (December 18, 1798), that he would:
14Von Tunzelman [1978, p. 54] presented a comparison of steam engine
prices which indicated that B&W were considerably more expensive for larger
size engines; e.g., in 1804 they charged £1,083 for a 20-hp. engine whereas
Fenton, Murray & Wood charged £600 and Goodrich £750. For engines up to
10 hp., B&W appear to have been competitive.
13
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. . . if possible get an estimate [of brass air pumps] &
forwarded by this evening’s coach & shall accompany
it with a new list of prices of Engines - we find that
considerable embarassment will ensue unless the re-
duction of our estimates is made very gradually the
whole reduction proposed to take place before March
21st 1799 viz from 45 pr% to 33 on London & frm 33 to
25 pr% on country we think should be effected by
monthly deductions - without this precaution we shall
have much difficulty in stearing clear of Disputes upon
this subject & certainly not succeed in accomplishing
the alteration witht exciting public attention. . .
[B&W 38/4]
A second letter to Watt, written later that day, lists the
proposed prices with the further proviso that the premium be
reduced on a monthly basis and stresses the need for gradual
reductions, perhaps hoping that no one would notice. He wrote:
I send you herewith the prices referred to in my letter
of this morning & we propose them for the ensuing
month to be stated at one pr % less or at 34 & 28 pr %
upon metal Maters & similar reductions to take place
monthly till we arrive at the permanent standard - Per-
haps it may be judged expedient to make a larger de-
duction from the London prices in order to bring them
sooner to the same standard as the country. From your
recent transactions with the Londoners you will be en-
abled to judge whether this distinction has or is likely
to create any disatisfaction & of course to decide upon
the propriety of extinguishing it more rapidly . . .
[B&W 38/4]
Watt jnr’s reply came from London a few days later when
he expressed some disquiet over the price reductions. He re-
sponded that he could not:
. . . help thinking that the proposed monthly reduction
will be troublesome & create some confusion with re-
spect to orders transmitted by Lawson, or any other
itinerant agent. The further reduction to be made at 4
pr % in one instance & 10 in the other is so small, that I
do not fear its having the effect you apprehend, more
especially as the last very considerable reduction was
not attended with such consequences & appears indeed
to have escaped observation. I should either propose to
continue the estimates you now give, for six months, &
then take 4 pr % from the Country & 5 pr % from the
14
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London price. The remaining 5 might remain upon the
London Engines until this time twelvemonths. I pre-
sume you have not yet made new Estimates, nor do I
think you can, until several Engines have been made
with the proposed alterations, which I hope you are
now carrying into effect. They will add to the price
considerably, unless deductions can be effected in
other matters . . .
[B&W E/7]
The problem seems to have been to find a way to make the
inevitable price reductions unobtrusively. Watt’s last comment
sounded a note of caution by suggesting that cost cutting might
become an issue as new changes were made to the engines they
had on offer.
Four months later, on the eve of the expiration of the en-
gine patent, the issues of the firm’s image, its prices, and its
competitive environment were highlighted by Watt jnr in a let-
ter to John Southern (April 24, 1799) when he wrote:
I think the estimates you propose sending to Mr
Tewsbury very proper, and I also think it very right
that the topics you state should be urged at some
length, particularly that our prices now, comprehended
nothing but a manufacturing profit & will not be ef-
fected by the expiration of our exclusive privilege. That
it is not our wish to vie with others in lowness of esti-
mates, but in goodness of workmanship, being well
connvinced by long experience that the best Engines
are the cheapest in the end. . . .
[B&W 33/5]
Even though the generally held view was that B&W engines
were the best available, Watt jnr was well aware that many
potential customers were prepared to compromise quality if
substantial cost savings were to be made. Watt held a very
short-term view because engines using high pressure steam
would soon become available and offer greater output for lower
overall cost [Hills, 1993]. The B&W engines, while strongly
built, did not change with advancing technology.
Use of Cost Information: In attempts to set a price for the differ-
ent sizes of engines, Watt continually referred to the cost of
engines already built as they were listed in the engine book
rather than base cost on a “standard” engine for each capacity.
The engine books are large books consisting of a printed list of
15
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all the parts required by a particular engine under the headings
“Cast Iron,” “Wrought Iron,” “Brass,” “Miscellaneous,” and “Fit-
ting.” The list is very detailed and as there were slight differ-
ences between engines, the detailed list of parts for a particular
customer could be specified. When working up a cost for a
particular engine, standard rates were used for the different
parts. These standard rates seem to have been determined as a
result of negotiations with employees and did not result from
an imposed standard [see Williams, 1994; Fleischman et al.,
1995 for a discussion of this process in relation to the Foundry
Department]. The standard rates appear to have been constant
for a number of years. Comparisons between the “standard”
cost of an engine and actual costs were made elsewhere; yet,
the engine book data were used for price development. There
appears to have been no attempt to use actual cost, even though
actual cost was available, nor is there any explanation for this
procedure.
The costs used in the following calculations come from the
engine books. These two examples are taken from a document
entitled “Calculations for new Estimates 4th June 1801” and
illustrate the calculation of price based on past cost. The docu-
ment, in Watt jnr’s handwriting, includes calculations for eight
different size engines:
Example 1:
4 Horse
18 Novr 1800
Bryson & son 267
add Cisterns for feed Apps }
& hot water } 2
Additional price of Boiler }
2/- pr Cwt on 13 Cwt } 1 ,, 6
—————
270 ,, 6
25 pr %  67,, 11
—————
£ 337,, 17
—————
But as a greater proportional profit should be laid on
these small Engines to Compensate for the trouble of
drawings &c it may stand in the Provisional Ests at
£ 350.
[B&W 7/VI/14]
16
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At this time 4-horse engines were not very common, and it
was felt that a small engine might create extra cost in its design
and assembly. Indeed, the elder Watt had made this very point
in his letter of 1796, quoted above:
Example 2:
14 Horse
1800
20 Aug Rigby & Chadwick 500. 4. 4
Deduct for Crank Fly Wheels }
£30 }
do Extra size of Br 10 }  40. 16
—— ——— £460. 4
10 Decr Huddart & Co 489. 16
Deduct for Crank & fly wheels
30
Do for stop pipe 5. 5 35. 5
—— ——— £454.11
1801
21 Jany Hibbert & Smethurst 486. 4
deduct for Dbl Crank Motion 21
Stop pipe & bonnet 5. 4  25. 4
—— ——— 461.15
—––——
3|1375. 15
458.11
Add for Cisterns 2.11
Addl for Boiler 33cwt at 2/- 3.16
—––——
463. 17
25 pr % 114. 19
—––——
£578. 16
Call it £600 as before
[B&W 7/VI/14]
The second example shows the calculation of a base cost
for these three engines by removing from the calculation the
cost of unique parts by taking an average, adding the cost of
additional items, and then adding a markup. The standard costs
for each individual engine manufactured were recorded in the
17
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Engine Books. As an example of the origin of the costs used in
the price calculations, the Engine Book for February 1800 -
February 1802 [B&W 232] lists the costs (summary) for the
Rigby & Chadwick engine mentioned above as:
Cwt Qrs Lbs £ S D
Cast Iron 192  2 5 210 171/2  11/2
Wrought Iron  16  1  11  73  71/2 111/2
Copper Brass &c 4  2 4  53  21/2  11/2
Boiler  35  25  73 19  41/2
Stores 5  81/2  61/2
Patterns 19  71/2
Carriage 4 171/2
Fitting 59  51/2  41/2
——————
500  41/2  41/2
The price calculations, and there are many still in exist-
ence, all show the same attention to detail with succeeding
price calculations being based on the average engine book cost
of previous engines of the same size.
As time went by, the products the firm offered became
more standardized; yet, reference to past cost was continually
made in the calculation of the price of engines. The markup
eventually declined to 25%, and then to 20%, with no extra
premium for London.
Monitoring Price: As successful businessmen, the partners were
obviously concerned to make sure that costs were covered and
a profit made. Watt jnr monitored costs and prices to ensure
that this continued to be the case. For example, a document
entitled “List of Engine Materials and Premiums from 30th
Septr 1798 to Do 1799” [B&W MII/7/2] compares the price with
the actual cost of all the engines built by both the Foundry and
the Manufactory during that period. Differences between the
actual profit and the computed profit based on a percentage
applied to engine book or “standard” cost were calculated and
the differences noted. In all cases a reasonable profit was made;
however, overall actual profit was lower than the expected
profit. This particular document makes no attempt to explain
the reason for the differences. However, the document reflects a
sophisticated awareness of the use of accounting data as a con-
trol tool. Perhaps complete correspondence between estimates
and actuals was an unreachable ideal because of the problems
18
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of estimating overhead. Nevertheless, managerment spent a
considerable effort in refining its attempts.
Price of Engine Parts: Price calculations were not limited to the
price of whole engines because a comprehensive list of prices
for individual spare parts was built up. Generally these prices
were based on the standard or engine book rates for making
that part plus a markup of 20 - 25% [B&W 7/IV]. In order to
calculate new prices, reference was continually made to the
cost of parts made previously. The comprehensiveness of this
process is illustrated in a document relating to the calculation
of the cost of a cast-iron beam rather than a wooden beam for a
40-horse engine in 1802. There appears to have been an inquiry
as to the extra cost, a cast-iron beam having technical advan-
tages over a wooden one:
Beam Extra Materials A & G Murray March 1802
Cast Iron Beam 56.11.16 20/- 56.17.101/2
Turning & fitting Do 9.12.101/2
Part expence of pattern 6.12.161/2
2 Wrot Iron Cutters for Caps 1.14.121/2
16 Steel wedges 11.111/2 1.15.131/2
—————
Blacking & weighing 1.15.131/2
—————
£ 75.17.171/2
—————
==================================================
Calculation of the difference between a Cast Iron Beam & a
Wooden Beam for a 40 Horse
Materials of Cast Iron Beam as above 75. 17.171⁄2
Main Gudgeon 5.11. 21 say 11 at 20/-
Outer end Do 1.13. 22
Inner end Do 1.13. 24 cwt
Caps for Do 1.12. 16 say 11 at 20/- 11 17.171⁄2
Boring & Turning Gudgeons & Caps 6. 16.171⁄2
Do Main Gudgeon 17.161⁄2
Part Expence of patterns 1. 13.161⁄2
—————
£ 94. 14.171⁄2
The following are from Messrs Wormauld & Cos
Wooden Beam - charged at the present prices - 1802
cwt
Main Gudgeon 4.10.110
19
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Saddle plate & Glands for intr extd  1. 3. 11
Gland for Centre of Beam  3. 0. 11
Sad & Plate & Glands for outer end  1. 1. 16
————
10. 0. 17 @ 20/- 10. 13.101⁄2
7 Pins & Nuts inner and back end
saddle plates 151 at 7d 4. 18.111⁄2
2 Beam Straps Nuts &c 205 at 7d 5. 19.171⁄2
Wrought Iron Gland for
back end of motion  22 at 7 . 12.101⁄2
end of beam  176 at 7d 5. 12.181⁄2
Turned pin for outer end saddle plate 47 2. 17.101⁄2
Turning Centre Gudgeon 12.161⁄2
Patterns 1. 11161⁄2
Weighing blacking &  10. 11161⁄2
—————
 30. 16.181⁄2
—————
Difference of Cost £ 63. 17. 111⁄2
15. 13. 111⁄2
—————
79. 10. 111⁄2
[B&W 7/IV/60]
Note that the difference in cost includes the markup of 25%
rounded down to achieve an even value, a common practice.
This customer would then have been asked to pay an extra £79
to have a cast-iron beam fitted instead of a wooden one. It
should be noted that there was no allowance for timber in the
calculation of the price of the wooden beam because it was
usual for the customer to supply the beam and the firm to
supply the appropriate fittings.
The document continues with the calculation of other parts
based on “extracts from the printed Daybook. . . . ” The stand-
ard costs of past work were used in many calculations and
estimates relating to future work. The record of past costs
formed an important database to be used in the calculation of
all prices.
CONCLUSION
The Soho Foundry was a new venture, designed from its
inception to build steam engines. Consequently, the factory was
built to ensure smooth and efficient working. The factory that
was built and staffed with dedicated, highly skilled, and innova-
tive people operated for many years. The Soho Foundry was
designed to operate in the same way as its products. As a steam
engine was designed to produce power, so too was the factory
20
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designed to produce steam engines smoothly and efficiently. As
steam engines were designed to be self-governing, so too the
factory, with accounting providing an essential part of this gov-
ernance.
The accounting system was set up to reflect the organiza-
tion of production. It was designed around profit centers and
recorded the flow of materials and work from one department
to another. Product was transferred using predetermined trans-
fer prices. Because the Soho Foundry was a pioneering venture,
it is important not to judge workable solutions found to the
problems that arose in the light of present knowledge and prac-
tice because of the differing contexts. The accounting processes
extant at the Soho Foundry in its early years continued for
many years, so it is reasonable to assume that they supplied the
perceived needs of that time. Certainly the existing number of
documents showing calculations still indicates that the ac-
counting system provided a database that was used by Watt in
the managerial process. Yet, it does not appear to have been
used to produce budgets or other forecasts.
In price calculations no reference was made to the prices
charged by the competition. All calculations were based on pre-
vious engine-book cost. B&W engines were in a unique situa-
tion, having been the first to use a condenser, leading to greater
efficiency and cost saving. Because of this uniqueness, the firm
traded on its reputation for quality but pursued with equal
vigor those firms that pirated their designs and tried to under-
cut their prices [Roll, 1930; Tann, 1980]. However, the impend-
ing ending of their patent in 1800 and the subsequent expected
expansion in competition forced its attention to the pricing
structure. The letters of the partners show their concern with
public opinion, yet imply a reluctance to engage their competi-
tors. Their celebration of their reputation for quality and con-
tinual reliance on historical data failed to encourage risk tak-
ing, and the firm soon lost its innovative edge. Compound and
high-pressure steam engines gradually captured a greater share
of the market [Law, 1990; Hills, 1993].
Cost accumulation was an important activity and was a
basis for further activity. Costs were used as a basis for prices
and as a check on profitability. As the above examples show,
prior costs were referenced when preparing quotations for the
supply of engines and the development of a standard price list.
They were also referred to when working out prices for non-
standard engines or parts. Accounting information was crucial
in establishing a base line for these calculations. The accumu-
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lated facts of the past then became a basis for the actions of the
future.
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